Immediate Appeal from Counsel Disqualification in Criminal Cases by Sherman, Lee I.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 1 Article 4
Immediate Appeal from Counsel Disqualification
in Criminal Cases
Lee I. Sherman
Copyright c 1983 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Lee I. Sherman, Immediate Appeal from Counsel Disqualification in Criminal Cases, 25 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 131 (1983), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss1/4
NOTES
IMMEDIATE APPEAL FROM COUNSEL
DISQUALIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES
The expanding number of lawyers and the overwhelming
caseloads with which both federal and state courts are struggling
demand that the legal profession "maintain high standards of pro-
fessional conduct."' In the courtroom, concern about competent
representation and proper professional conduct has led to an in-
creasing number of motions for disqualification of counsel.2 Dis-
qualification motions occur in both civil and criminal cases, al-
though for different motives and reasons.$ In either context, any
party may move to disqualify opposing counsel.4 A judge also may
disqualify counsel sua sponte if a conflict of interest exists or a
question arises concerning a particular lawyer's competence. Re-
gardless of who raises the issue of counsel disqualification, or the
reasons for doing so, a motion to disqualify counsel creates
problems that transcend the merits of the particular case. A dis-
qualification motion delays the trial, increases litigation costs, and
may even prompt ethical investigations. If the motion is granted,
the disqualification deprives a party of his chosen counsel and
causes further delay while a new attorney becomes familiar with
1. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBiLTrrY Canon 1 (1979). The care taken by the
drafters of the new MODEL RULES OF PROFsSIONAL CoNDuCr indicates the importance of
professional standards to the legal profession. The Commission on Evaluation of Profes-
sional Standards began work on a draft of the new Model Rules in 1977, but the American
Bar Association has not yet adopted a final form of the new rules. The need for a commis-
sion to evaluate the Code arose less than ten years after the American Bar Association
adopted the Code in 1969, which indicates the concern for adequate regulation of profes-
sional conduct.
2. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 437 n.9 (2d Cir. 1980) (attributing increased
disqualification motions primarily to dilatory trial tactics), vacated, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
3. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
4. Attempts by criminal defendants to disqualify prosecutors occur infrequently, and en-
joy only limited success. See, e.g., United States v. Caggiano, 660 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982); State v. Powell, 186 Conn. 547, 442 A.2d 939 (1982).
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the case.5
Following the trial court's resolution of the disqualification mo-
tion, the most compelling question for litigants is whether they im-
mediately can appeal the court's order. An appellate court's will-
ingness to hear an appeal of a disqualification order hinges
primarily upon the nature of the case-criminal or civil-and the
disposition of the motion-a grant or denial. These two variables
create four distinct classes into which counsel disqualification cases
fall, each requiring a separate analysis to determine whether an
immediate appeal is appropriate.
The first class of counsel disqualification cases results from crim-
inal actions in which a court denies a disqualification motion. Lit-
tle appellate litigation has occurred in this area, primarily because
criminal defendants rarely attempt to disqualify prosecutors.' Al-
though a prosecutor occasionally does move to disqualify the de-
fendant's counsel, an immediate appeal of the trial court's denial
rarely furthers the prosecutor's interests. An immediate appeal de-
lays the pending prosecution, a situation most prosecutors seek to
avoid. In the few criminal cases in which a party has attempted to
appeal an order denying a disqualification motion, courts have not
found the order immediately appealable.
The second class of disqualification cases concerns denials of dis-
qualification motions in civil actions. A recent Supreme Court de-
cision resolved previously conflicting decisions in this area.8 In
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,9 the Court held that or-
ders denying disqualification motions in civil suits are not immedi-
ately appealable. The Court, however, did not address the appeala-
bility of orders, in either the criminal or civil context, granting
5. See Comment, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualification of
Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 450 (1978).
6. Reasons for the scarcity of attempts by criminal defendants to disqualify the prosecut-
ing attorney are speculative. Perhaps many lawyers for criminal defendants never consider
the possibility of disqualifying the government's counsel, or do not think that filing a dis-
qualification motion would be in the client's best interest.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Caggiano, 660 F.2d 184, 191 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 945 (1982); In re April 1977 Grand Jury Subpoenas, 584 F.2d 1366 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 934 (1979).
8. See Comment, supra note 5.
9. 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
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disqualification motions.10
The third class encompasses orders granting disqualification mo-
tions in civil cases. Since Firestone, three circuits have considered
the appealability of these orders. The United States Courts of Ap-
peals for the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have found that
orders granting disqualification motions in civil cases are immedi-
ately appealable."" These courts have distinguished orders that
grant disqualification motions from orders that deny disqualifica-
tion motions, as in Firestone. The distinction is based upon the
immediate and substantial disruptive effects that result when a
court disqualifies either party's counsel. 12
The fourth class concerns criminal cases in which the trial court
has granted counsel disqualification. Before Firestone, several cir-
cuits had held that a party could appeal immediately an order
granting disqualification in criminal cases.1 3 Since Firestone, the
circuits that have considered such appeals have reached varying
conclusions. In United States v. Greger,1 4 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an order granting a dis-
qualification motion in a criminal case was not immediately ap-
pealable. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in United States v.
10. For further discussion of Firestone, see infra text accompanying notes 38-47. See also
Braverman, A Blow for Injustice, 69 ILL. B.J. 408 (1981); Note, Civil Procedure- Interlocu-
tory Appeals: Orders Denying Disqualification of Counsel are not Appealable Pursuant to
the Collateral Order Exception, 56 TuL. L. Rxv. 1035 (1982); Eighth Circuit Survey-Civil
Procedure, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1021 (1981). See also Significant Development, The Col-
lateral Order Doctrine After Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord: The Appealability of
Orders Denying Motions for Appointment of Counsel, 62 B.U.L. Rxv. 845 (1982).
11. Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Coor-
dinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 658 F.2d 1355 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982); Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
12. Unlike orders denying a motion for counsel disqualification, "[w]hen a district court
grants disqualification, the effect of the court's action is immediate and measurable. The
party opposing the motion is abruptly deprived of his counsel and, provided he desires to
proceed with his action, the litigation is disrupted while he secures new counsel." Duncan v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020, 1027 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 895 (1981). For further discussion of the differences between orders that grant
disqualification and those that deny disqualification, see infra text accompanying notes 107-
11.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Duklewski, 567 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591
(2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975).
14. 657 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983).
19.831 133
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Agosto,15 and the Second Circuit in United States v. Cunning-
ham,"6 held that a defendant may appeal immediately the disquali-
fication of his counsel.
This Note discusses the conflicting positions among the courts
concerning the appealability of counsel disqualification in criminal
cases, the rationale behind each court's holding, and the policies
that each court has considered persuasive. The Note concludes
that the decisions of the Eighth and Second Circuits are better
reasoned, and that an order granting counsel disqualification in
criminal cases should be immediately appealable because it satis-
fies the collateral order exception to the final-judgment rule.
THE FINAL-JUDGMENT RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
The Final-Judgment Rule
The federal judicial system limits the availability of interlocu-
tory appeals.17 Section 1291 of the Judicial Code provides the pri-
mary means by which a federal circuit court may hear an appeal of
a federal district court's decision,'8 giving the federal courts of ap-
peals jurisdiction over any "final decision" of the district courts."9
The final-judgment rule advances the policy of judicial economy by
avoiding the delay and expense that piecemeal appellate review of
disputed issues would entail.20
15. 675 F.2d 965 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 77 (1982).
16. 672 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1982). See also United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.
1982).
17. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1292 (1976). If limiting the number of interlocutory appeals
were not a problem, then a strict interpretation of § 1291 would be unnecessary, see infra
notes 19-23 and accompanying text, and no need would exist for § 1292, see infra notes 24-
25 and accompanying text.
18. The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction from all final decisions of the dis-
trict courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of
the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
19. Id.
20. See Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945). The final-judg-
ment rule also promotes efficient decisionmaking by the appellate courts. "[M]any potential
points of appeal are corrected in the course of trial, prove non-prejudicial, or are mooted by
the outcome." Comment, supra note 5, at 452. For an historical analysis of the final-judg-
ment rule, see Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932).
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Determining whether a particular order represents a final deci-
sion depends on several factors. A federal court of appeals may
deny jurisdiction if the appellant has an adequate remedy absent
an immediate appeal.21 In criminal cases, therefore, the appellate
court must determine whether a new trial is an adequate remedy
for a defendant who is convicted after the trial court has disquali-
fied the defendant's counsel. The defendant must demonstrate
that the order appealed from had a final and irreparable effect on
his rights.22 The final and irreparable effect may involve any of the
defendant's rights, not just those rights most closely connected
with the substantive concerns of the case. Because counsel disqual-
ifications in civil and criminal cases are not "final decisions" on the
merits, appealable orders must satisfy one of three exceptions to
the final-judgment rule of section 1291.23
Discretionary Appeals
Three exceptions to the final-judgment rule allow an appellate
court to review a trial court's decision before the trial court enters
its final judgment. The Interlocutory Appeals Act 24 provides the
first exception, allowing an appellate court to exercise discretion-
ary review.of a trial court's interlocutory orders in civil cases. The
trial judge must state in writing that the order involves a control-
21. Whether an adequate remedy exists if the appellate court denies an immediate appeal
is a major point of contention in many of the cases discussing the collateral order doctrine.
Most of the cases discussed in this Note ultimately have turned upon the adequacy of an
alternative remedy. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981);
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978) (rejecting a direct appeal of an order de-
nying defendant's motion to dismiss for alleged violations of defendant's sixth amendment
right to a speedy trial); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (permitting a direct
appeal of an order denying defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds);
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (permitting a direct appeal of an order denying a motion
to reduce bail).
22. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (after final
judgment, "it will be too late effectively to review the present order, and the rights con-
ferred by the statute [28 U.S.C. § 1292], if it is applicable, will have been lost, probably
irreparably").
23. For a thorough discussion of the collateral order doctrine, exceptions to the final-
judgment rule, and counsel disqualifications, see Comment, supra note 5. For a discussion of
the collateral order doctrine and motions for appointment of counsel, see Significant Devel-
opment, supra note 10.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
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ling question of law about which a difference of opinion exists, and
that an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate
resolution of the litigation.25 The Act, however, is beyond the scope
of this discussion.
The writ of mandamus offers a second exception to the final-
judgment rule and is available in both criminal and civil cases.26
Courts exercise discretion in granting mandamus and limit its use
to exceptional situations to avoid disrupting ordinary appellate
procedures.2 7 Appellate courts considering immediate appeals of
counsel disqualification orders in criminal cases have discussed the
use of mandamus, but have found that the particular cases under
consideration have not warranted such "extraordinary relief. '28
25. Under § 1292(b), the trial judge must "be of the opinion that such an order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for differences of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termina-
tion of the litigation. . . ." Id.
After the trial court certifies the order, the court of appeals has discretion to hear or
dismiss the appeal. This certification procedure for counsel disqualification orders in civil
cases has created some disagreement among the circuits. Compare Community Broadcasting
of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (endorsing the use of § 1292(b) in
limited situations) with Trone v. Smith, 553 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding § 1292(b)
certification improper for obtaining review of denials of disqualification) and Waters v.
Western Co. of N. Am., 436 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir. 1971) (dismissing an appeal from a disqual-
ification denial as improvidently granted).
Section 1292 applies to civil actions only. In addition, the interlocutory appeal permitted
by section 1292(b) is available only for "an order not otherwise appealable." Counsel dis-
qualification orders in criminal cases are otherwise appealable if they come within the Co-
hen collateral order exception. See infra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976).
27. C. WRIGHT, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 102, at 516 (3d. ed.
1976).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Greger, 657 F.2d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983). In Greger, the Court noted that a writ of mandamus is appropriate if
(1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as a direct
appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires. . . .(2) The petitioner will be
damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal .... (3) The dis-
trict court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law .... (4) The district
court's order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of the
federal rules .... (5) The district court's order raises new and important
problems, or issues of law of first impression.
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55
(9th Cir. 1977)).
Some recent cases support the use of mandamus in discretionary appeals of counsel dis-
qualification orders in civil cases. Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d
1022 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Chugach Elec. Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441 (9th
136
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Mandamus would not be necessary in an appeal of a counsel dis-
qualification order if the appellate court determined that the order
came within the third exception to the final-judgment rule, the col-
lateral order doctrine.
The United States Supreme Court first enunciated the collateral
order doctrine in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.29 Co-
hen involved an order denying the defendant's motion to require
the plaintiff to post security for the defendant's reasonable ex-
penses incurred in a stockholder derivative action.30 The United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey refused to ap-
ply the New Jersey statute requiring such security,31 but the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 2
The Supreme Court then interpreted section 1291 as including de-
cisions that "fall in that small class which finally determine claims
of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the ac-
tion, too important to be denied review and too independent of the
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred un-
til the whole case is adjudicated."3 3 The Court found that the or-
der was appealable as a final disposition of a claimed right which
was not a basic element of the cause of action, and that did not
require consideration with the substantive aspects of the case."
In Cohen, the Supreme Court identified the general elements of
an immediate right of appeal under section 1291. In recent deci-
sions applying the collateral order doctrine, the Court has devel-
oped three specific requirements.3 5 The Court stated in Coopers &
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967); Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1964),
clarified 370 F.2d 418 (9th Ciro 1966). Arguments supporting the use of mandamus in ap-
peals of counsel disqualification in civil cases are considerably stronger than arguments for
its use in criminal cases. See generally Comment, supra note 5, at 472-482.
29. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
30. Id. at 543.
31. 7 F.R.D. 352 (D.N.J. 1947). See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 (West 1939).
32. 170 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1948).
33. 337 U.S. at 546.
34. Id. at 546-47.
35. See United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 102 S. Ct. 3081 (1982) (per curiam);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449. U.S. 368 (1981); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977). Several lower
courts also have applied three requirements to collateral orders. See, e.g., United States v.
Greger, 657 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983); Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 438 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
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Lybrand v. Livesay36 that "[t]o come within the "small class" of
decisions excepted from the final-judgment rule by Cohen, the or-
der must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action,
and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."
The Cohen collateral order doctrine, however, is essentially a
fiction. The orders excepted from the final-judgment rule still must
satisfy the requirements of section 1291 before an appellate court
may exercise jurisdiction. 7 To allow immediate appeals, the Court
has simply labelled a limited class of orders "final decisions."
Therefore, an order granting or denying a counsel disqualification
motion is immediately appealable under the collateral order doc-
trine if the order conclusively determines a question that is sepa-
rate from the merits and is effectively unreviewable after the trial.
Counsel Disqualification Orders and the Collateral Order Doc-
trine: Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord
Of the four categories of cases in which a direct appeal of a
counsel disqualification order may arise,88 the Supreme Court has
addressed only one. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,9
the Court held that the denial of a motion to disqualify counsel in
a civil case did not constitute a collateral order, and thus was not
immediately appealable. Firestone, the defendant in four consoli-
dated product-liability suits, had filed a motion to disqualify the
plaintiff's counsel. The district court denied Firestone's motion. On
By contrast, one commentator has identified four distinct requirements:
The order must be (1) collateral-the issues bearing on the order must be es-
sentially unrelated to the issues of the main dispute; (2) conclusive-the order
must be final, neither tentative nor incomplete; (3) impracticable of appeal
from final judgment-the asserted right "will have been lost, probably irrepa-
rably" if review is delayed; and (4) of public importance-the order should
involve "a serious and unsettled question," and not simply the exercise of trial
court discretion.
Comment, supra note 5 at 454-55 (citations omitted).
36. 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). The Court in Livesay found that an order denying a request
for class certification was not within the "'small class' of decisions excepted from the final-
judgment rule by Cohen." Id.
37. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 6-16.
39. 449 U.S. 368 (1981). For further discussion of Firestone, see the articles cited supra
note 10.
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appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held that the proponent of a motion to disqualify may not seek
immediate appeal of an order denying the motion.40
After reviewing the history of the collateral order doctrine, the
Supreme Court recognized that an order denying a counsel dis-
qualification motion in a civil case met the conclusive-determina-
tion requirement of the collateral order rule.41 The Court assumed
that the disqualification order also satisfied the second require-
ment of the collateral order test, that the disqualification issue be
collateral to the merits of the action.42 The Court then focused on
the third requirement of the Cohen test and determined that Fire-
stone had failed to demonstrate that the denial of an immediate
appeal prejudiced Firestone's rights. An appellate court could re-
view the trial court's denial of the disqualification motion effec-
tively on an appeal of the final judgment.43
The Court based its decision in Firestone on policies related to
judicial integrity and the efficient use of judicial resources. The
Court feared that "[p]ermitting piecemeal appeals would under-
mine the independence of the district judge, as well as the special
role that the individual plays in our judicial system." 4 The Court
also sought to protect the opposing party from the harassment and
cost of successive appeals from various trial court rulings during
the course of litigation.45 Apparently, the Court feared that al-
40. 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated, 449 U.S. 368 (1981). The Eighth Circuit also
decided the merits of the district court's order. 612 F.2d at 377. The Supreme Court agreed
that the order was not immediately appealable, but vacated the Eighth Circuit's decision on
the merits. "A court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without
jurisdiction, and thus, by definition, a jurisdictional ruling may never be made prospective
only." 449 U.S. at 379.
41. "It 'conclusively determine[s] the disputed question,' because the only issue is
whether challenged counsel will be permitted to continue his representation." 449 U.S. at
375-76.
42. Id. at 376.
43. "An order refusing to disqualify counsel plainly falls within the large class of orders
that are indeed reviewable on appeal after final judgment, and not within the much smaller
class of those that are not." Id. at 377.
44. Id. at 374.
45. "In addition, the rule is in accordance with the sensible policy of 'avoid[ing] the ob-
struction to just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a suc-
cession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from
its initiation to entry of judgment."' Id. at 374 (quoting Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U.S. 323, 325 (1940)).
1983]
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lowing immediate appeals in civil cases might encourage dilatory
tactics, particularly in situations like Firestone in which a major
corporation could substantially raise litigation costs for all parties
by repeatedly filing such appeals. By narrowly construing the final-
judgment rule of section 1291, the Court fostered the policy of effi-
cient judicial administration.46
Although the policy considerations are significant, they fail to
overcome an appellant's right to effective review of the order deny-
ing his disqualification motion once he satisfies all three require-
ments of the Cohen test. The Court in Firestone recognized that a
party in some situations might suffer irreparable damage if he
could not appeal a disqualification order until final resolution of
the primary litigation.47 An order granting counsel disqualification
in criminal cases represents such a situation.
APPEALABILITY OF ORDERS'GRANTING COUNSEL DISQUALIFICATION IN
CRIMINAL CASES
Prior to Firestone, several circuits considered the immediate ap-
pealability of orders granting counsel disqualifications in criminal
cases.48 More recent federal circuit court decisions in criminal
cases have focused on the policies that the Supreme Court weighed
in Firestone.49 Because Firestone addressed denials of disqualifica-
tion motions in civil cases, the circuits have disagreed on whether
Firestone controls grants of disqualification in criminal cases.
United States v. Greger
In United States v. Greger, 50 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit considered for the first time Firestone's
effect on the appealability of an order granting counsel disqualifi-
cation in a criminal case. The government indicted Greger after
investigating potential criminal activity in four Las Vegas casi-
46. 449 U.S. at 374.
47. Id. at 378, n.13.
48. See supra note 13.
49. The consideration of Firestone has varied from the detailed analysis in United States
v. Greger, 657 F.2d 1109, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983), to the
cursory treatment in United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 968 n.1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 77 (1982).
50. 657 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983).
[Vol. 25:131
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nos.51 Greger's lawyer, Oscar B. Goodman, also represented several
other defendants who were targets of the investigation. s The gov-
ernment intended to call several of Goodman's clients and former
clients to testify against Greger. 53 Because of the potential conflict
of interest, the government moved to disqualify Goodman as
Greger's counsel." Both Goodman and Greger denied any conflict
of interest and believed that Greger need not waive his right to
conflict-free representation.55 The district judge rejected the defen-
dant's arguments and disqualified Goodman.56
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to
hear an immediate appeal of the order. The court reasoned that a
pretrial order disqualifying counsel in a criminal case was not a
"final decision" within the Cohen collateral order doctrine and,
therefore, was not appealable under section 1291.57 The court
found that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Firestone applied to
criminal as well as civil cases.58 In fact, the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that the Supreme Court's concern with efficient judicial adminis-
tration was even more appropriate in criminal cases than in civil
ones.5e The court suggested that the Cohen collateral order doc-
trine should be "more sparingly applied in the criminal context"60
51. Greger was the manager of a casino, and the government alleged that he extorted
bribes and kickbacks from purveyors. Id. at 1114.
52. Id.
53. The government has represented to the court that several of Goodman's clients
will be called to testify against Greger and that their testimony "will be di-
rectly incriminating" to Greger. The government argues that virtually all of the
potential defenses available to Greger will implicate Goodman's other cli-
ents. ... The government further informed the court that it had attempted to
secure Goodman's voluntary withdrawal by making available to the defense its
evidence against Greger but that this offer, like all of its efforts to initiate plea
bargain negotiations, had been rebuffed.
Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1110.
58. Id. at 1112.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court recognized "that in a criminal context we deal with the party's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel of choice, but if this right may be protected by appeal after
final judgment, the addition of this constitutional element makes no difference to our analy-
sis." Id.
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because the criminal process should move swiftly; immediate ap-
peals of trial and pretrial orders discourage speedy trials. In the
court's view, "[a]dherence to [the] rule of finality has been particu-
larly stringent in criminal prosecutions because 'the delays and
disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal', which the rule is
designed to avoid, 'are especially inimical to the effective and fair
administration of the criminal law.' "61
The court in Greger based its decision on the assumption that
an appeal after final judgment adequately protected the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to counsel of choice. The court rea-
soned that the threat to the defendant's right posed by the pretrial
disqualification order did not outweigh the interest in economical
judicial administration. 2 The Ninth Circuit, however, may have
given insufficient weight to the defendant's right to counsel.
Although the court quoted at length two arguments favoring a
distinction between orders that grant disqualification motions and
those that deny them,"s the court determined that orders granting
61. Id. (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977), and DiBella v. United
States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962)).
62. For a discussion of the effect that the denial of an appeal from a disqualification order
has on a party's right to counsel, see infra text accompanying note 130.
63. The court noted that when a disqualification motion is granted,
the losing party is immediately separated from counsel of his choice. If the
order is erroneous, correcting it by an appeal at the end of the case might well
require a party to show that he lost the case because he was improperly forced
to change counsel. This would appear to be an almost insurmountable burden.
In addition, permitting an immediate appeal from the grant of a disqualifica-
tion motion does not disrupt the litigation, since the trial must be stayed in
any case while new counsel is obtained. Moreover, the grant of a disqualifica-
tion motion may effectively terminate the litigation if the party whose counsel
is disqualified cannot afford to hire new counsel to begin the litigation anew.
657 F.2d at 1112 (quoting Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, at 440-41 (2d Cir. 1980),
vacated, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981)).
The court also noted an article discussing the distinction between orders granting motions
to disqualify and orders denying them:
Unlike disqualification denials, orders granting disqualification are [not] sub-
ject to appellate review after final judgment. If, after the disqualification, the
party wins the case, the disqualification becomes moot despite the cost that
disqualification imposed on the party. If the party whose attorney is disquali-
fied loses the case, then the error would be viewed as nonprejudicial, except
possibly in the most extreme circumstances. This is because, to prove
prejudice, it would be necessary to establish that replacement counsel had
been so incompetent and unprepared relative to former counsel as to have af-
fected the case. Such a situation is improbable.
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counsel disqualifications in criminal cases should not be treated
differently than orders denying counsel disqualifications. The court
noted that the defendant might triumph in the criminal proceed-
ing and not appeal the disqualification order-"an obvious boon to
the system and . ..just the sort of happy result envisioned by
§ 1291's requirement that appeals not be taken piecemeal."" In
the Ninth Circuit's view, the defendant who successfully defended
the criminal charge would lose nothing, even if the disqualification
order was erroneous.6 5
If a court found the defendant guilty in the criminal case, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the defendant's post-conviction appeal
of a counsel disqualification order would adequately protect his
right to counsel. The court recognized that the burden of persuad-
ing an appellate court that the replacement counsel's performance
caused the defendant's conviction would be insurmountable. 6 The
court reasoned that if the defendant demonstrated on appeal
merely that the disqualification order was erroneous, however, he
would be entitled to a new trial.67 Although a new trial would re-
sult in additional costs for the judicial system, the court preferred
those costs to the costs of piecemeal litigation.68 The court, how-
ever, failed to consider the financial and emotional costs to the
defendant.6 9
The Ninth Circuit in Greger held open the possibility that some
orders granting counsel disqualification might be appealable before
657 F.2d at 1112-13 (quoting Comment, supra note 5, at 458 n.39).
64. 657 F.2d at 1113.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 723 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981) ("No prejudice
need be shown where district court violates defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
by unreasonably refusing to grant a continuance... .")). The Ninth Circuit also distin-
guished the right to counsel from the right against double jeopardy on the basis that the
latter right is irretrievably lost if not vindicated before trial. 657 F.2d at 1113. See infra text
accompanying notes 117-18.
68. 657 F.2d at 1113.
69. The court noted that if the defendant could not afford counsel for the second trial,
the government would have to provide counsel. Id. But the court did not indicate whether
the defendant could demand, at government expense, the attorney that the defendant origi-
nally had retained. Moreover, a court-appointed counsel is not available to the defendant
who can afford counsel for a second trial. The emotional costs to the defendant exist in
either case.
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final judgment. Although the court found that disqualification or-
ders were not directly appealable under section 1291, the court in-
dicated that it might permit immediate review in some cases under
a writ of mandamus.7 0 The court, however, did not believe that the
circumstances in Greger justified such extraordinary relief.7 1
United States v. Agosto
In United States v. Agosto,7 2 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit heard an appeal of an order granting a mo-
tion for counsel disqualification in a criminal case. Agosto involved
six defendants indicted for mail fraud, wire fraud, misapplication
of bank funds, false entries on bank records, and conspiracy. 3
Each defendant had separate counsel when the prosecution moved
to disqualify four of the attorneys. Counsel for four of the defen-
dants previously represented other defendants, as well as certain
witnesses who had testified at the grand jury proceedings and who
were likely to testify at the trial. 4 The district court judge ordered
the disqualification of three of the defense counsel because of a
conflict of interest.7 5 The Eighth Circuit allowed an immediate ap-
peal and affirmed the disqualification of one attorney, reversed the
disqualification of the two others, and instructed the district judge
to obtain proper waivers from the clients.7
The Eighth Circuit's analysis of the counsel disqualifications in
Agosto is important to the issue of immediate appealability to the
extent that it illustrates the rationale for the court's decision to
hear the appeal at all.77 The court's determination that an order
70. Id. at 1114. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
71. 657 F.2d at 1114-15.
72. 675 F.2d 965 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 77 (1982).
73. Id. at 968.
74. Id. at 969.
75. Id. at 974-77. The appellate court identified two methods by which an attorney's prior
representation of another defendant might cause a conflict of interest. The court suggested
that "privileged information obtained from the former client might be relevant to cross-
examination [and] that the attorney's pecuniary interest in possible future business may
cause him to make trial decisions with a view toward avoiding prejudice to the client he
formerly represented." Id. at 971. Three of the attorneys in Agosto had previously repre-
sented several of the codefendants.
76. Id. at 974, 976-77.
77. In its analysis of the disqualification order, the court stressed the rights of the defen-
dants whose attorneys had been disqualified. Id. at 974-77. The court articulated policies
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granting disqualification in criminal cases is immediately appeala-
ble appeared in a footnote. 8 Previously, the Eighth Circuit had
stated that an order granting a motion for disqualification was ap-
pealable under the collateral order doctrine.79 When Firestone was
appealed, the Supreme Court decided only the appealability of an
order denying a motion to disqualify counsel.80 The Eighth Circuit
in Agosto, therefore, saw no reason to abandon its previous posi-
tion that orders granting disqualification were immediately
appealable.81
In the same footnote, the court cited Greger without discus-
sion.82 The court also cited other post-Firestone decisions that
found grants of counsel disqualification motions appealable in civil
cases.83 Without any extended discussion, the court refused to dis-
tinguish between the appealability of orders in civil and criminal
cases, and agreed with those circuits that had found disqualifica-
tion orders appealable. 84
Although the Eighth Circuit did not state the policies that in-
duced it to hear an immediate appeal of the disqualification orders
in Agosto, 85 the basis for the decision is evident from the court's
detailed discussion of each disqualification order. The Eighth Cir-
that mandated an immediate appeal. Id. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
78. Id. at 968 n.1.
79. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 612 F.2d 377, 378 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated,
449 U.S. 368 (1981).
80. The Supreme Court did not discuss whether an order granting a motion to disqualify
counsel was immediately appealable. See supra text accompanying notes 38-47.
81. 675 F.2d at 968 n.1.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Liti-
gation, 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982); and Duncan v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
895 (1981)).
84. 675 F.2d at 968 n.1. The court also noted several pre-Firestone circuit court decisions
that had found orders granting disqualification motions immediately appealable in criminal
cases: United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Duklewski, 567
F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1975);
United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975).
85. The tenor of the footnote indicated that the court did not consider a defense of the
decision to hear the appeal necessary. Firestone did not alter the court's earlier position
that an order granting a motion for counsel disqualification was immediately appealable. By
allowing an immediate appeal, therefore, the Eighth Circuit acted consistently with its ear-
lier position on the issue.
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cuit used a balancing test to assess the merits of each order. The
court weighed the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel
against the possibility of a conflict of interest and the conflict's ef-
fect on the administration of justice."6 The court emphasized the
defendant's right to counsel of his choice and the deferrence that
courts must give to that choice.8 7 A conflict of interest may weaken
the effectiveness of counsel, but the court stated that a defendant
may "waive his right to the assistance of counsel unhindered by a
conflict of interest, provided that waiver is knowing and intelli-
gent."88 The court's discussion of the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel indicates the importance of the counsel disqualifi-
cation issue and the need to allow an immediate appeal of the dis-
qualification order.8 9 If the court did not allow an immediate ap-
peal of the disqualification order, the defendant would lose
irretrievably his right to choose his own counsel.
United States v. Cunningham
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also
has considered the appealability of counsel disqualification orders
since Firestone. In United States v. Cunningham," the Second
86. 675 F.2d at 970 (citing United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975) (interests
that a court must balance include "individual constitutional protections, public policy and
public interest in the administration of justice, and basic concepts of fundamental
fairness")).
87. The court noted that "defendants are free to employ counsel of their own choice and
the courts are afforded little leeway in interfering with that choice." 675 F.2d at 969 (quot-
ing United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075
(1979)).
88. 675 F.2d at 969-70.
89. The Eighth Circuit in Agosto was not the first court to distinguish the holding in
Firestone from cases granting disqualification motions. The Ninth Circuit in In re Coordi-
nated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982), distinguished Greger and identified important con-
siderations that made the disqualification order immediately appealable under the collateral
order doctrine. The court noted the material change in position of the party whose counsel
was removed and the burden on appeal from final judgment of showing that the change of
counsel determined the outcome. 658 F.2d at 1357-58. These dual concerns are equally ap-
parent in the criminal context. See also Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 646 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
90. 672 F.2d 1064, 1066 n.1 (2d Cir. 1982). The Second Circuit also allowed an immediate
appeal of a disqualification order in a criminal case in United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881
(2d Cir. 1982). As in Cunningham, the court did not discuss the basis for jurisdiction over
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Circuit held that orders disqualifying counsel in criminal cases are
immediately appealable. The government indicted Cunningham
and a codefendant, Sweeney, for conspiring "to evade the income
tax laws, to obstruct various criminal and grand jury investiga-
tions, and to impede the prosecution of an alleged coconspirator."9 1
Following the indictment, the government moved for the dis-
qualification of Cunningham's counsel, Tigar, on the ground that
Tigar's previous representation of an unindicted coconspirator
whom the government intended to call as a witness created a con-
flict of interest.92 Similarly, the government moved to disqualify
Sweeney's counsel, Kennedy, on the ground that the prosecution
planned to call Kennedy as a witness to explain the testimony of
yet another government witness.9 3 The trial court ordered the dis-
qualification of both Tigar and Kennedy, and the defendants im-
mediately appealed the orders. 4 The Second Circuit reversed the
order with respect to Tigar and vacated the order with respect to
Kennedy.9 5
Although the Second Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit in Agosto,
did not indicate the basis for its jurisdiction, 6 the court's rationale
for hearing the appeals emerged in its discussion of the merits of
each order. The court stressed that Cunningham's right to repre-
sentation by counsel of his choice outweighed the government's in-
terest in disqualifying his counsel due to a potential conflict of in-
terest.9 7 The court showed equal concern for Sweeney's interest in
being represented by counsel of his choice, and remanded the case
the appeal, but focused on the merits of the disqualification decision and the defendant's
right to counsel.
91. 672 F.2d at 1066.
92. Id.
93. Id. The government anticipated calling Kennedy to explain the testimony of a recep-
tionist at Sweeney's law firm. The receptionist was able to testify about statements that
Kennedy made to her concerning an earlier criminal case involving Cunning-
ham-Sweeney's law partner-and a friend of both defendants, John Spain. Kennedy alleg-
edly had made vaguely incriminating statements, suggesting that obstruction of justice had
occurred in an earlier trial. Id. at 1069-70.
94. Id. at 1066.
95. Id. The court remanded the order concerning Kennedy for further proceedings to de-
termine whether the testimony of a government witness would be admissible. Id.
96. The court merely indicated in a footnote that disqualification orders are immediately
appealable. Id. at 1066 n.1.
97. Id.
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to clarify whether the government actually needed to call Kennedy
as a witness.9 8 If Kennedy were not likely to appear as a witness,
then Sweeney's sixth amendment right to choose Kennedy as
counsel outweighed the remote possibility that a conflict of interest
might arise. As in Agosto, the court's reinstatement of one of the
disqualified lawyers indicated the appropriateness of an immediate
appeal. The Second Circuit reasoned that the defendant would suf-
fer serious harm if he were wrongly deprived of his right to counsel
in the criminal proceeding.99
Conflicting Policies of Greger, Agosto, and Cunningham
Whether a court allows an immediate appeal of a disqualification
order under the collateral order doctrine depends upon which poli-
cies the court deems most important. The decisions in Greger,
Agosto, and Cunningham reflect the conflicting policies: effective
judicial administration and the avoidance of unnecessary delay in
litigation must be weighed against the need to protect the defen-
dant's constitutional right to counsel.
Limiting appeals before final judgment simplifies the judicial
process and avoids delays. The judicial system should discourage
unnecessary delays, and appellate courts should avoid second-
guessing every ruling by a trial judge. The question underlying im-
mediate appeals of disqualification orders in criminal cases, how-
ever, is whether the resulting delay is actually unnecessary. Hear-
ing the disqualification motion delays the trial to begin with;
hearing an appeal of the resulting decision does not prolong that
delay unnecessarily if it is essential to protect a defendant's right
98. Id.
99. Cunningham's interest in having Tigar represent him is particularly strong.
Unlike many defendants who retain counsel only upon arrest or indictment,
Cunningham has relied on Tigar for more than six years in a substantial num-
ber of investigations, prosecutions, and related litigations. Tigar's success on
behalf of Cunningham, obtaining the dismissal of four criminal indictments
and the invalidation by the United States Supreme Court of a state statute,
has naturally enhanced Cunningham's confidence in Tigar.... The disqualifi-
cation of Tigar from any further role in Cunningham's defense in this case
would not merely defeat Cunningham's abstract right to be represented by
counsel of his choice; it would subject him to real prejudice in this criminal
prosecution.
Id. at 1070-71.
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to counsel.
In Greger, the Ninth Circuit addressed the defendant's argu-
ment that because the disqualification motion had interrupted the
trial in the first instance, no undue delay would result if the appel-
late court allowed an immediate appeal of the resulting order. 00
The court concluded that the argument was "quite unconvincing,
particularly in a criminal case where delay can be so damaging." 10 1
A closer examination suggests that the court's concern with delay
may have been misplaced. Not only does the defendant suffer
harm if a court denies a direct appeal, but the defendant also must
retain new counsel. Delay occurs because new counsel must become
familiar with the case. Thus, delay stemming from an order dis-
qualifying counsel seems inevitable, regardless of whether a court
grants or denies an immediate appeal.
If the Ninth Circuit assumed correctly that immediate appeals
of counsel disqualifications would cause unnecessary delays, the
appeals could have an adverse effect on prosecutors, the legal pro-
fession, and the judicial system. A prosecutor who found the po-
tential delay from an immediate appeal harmful to his case might
be reluctant to move for counsel disqualification when an apparent
conflict of interest arose. If the defendant must await the trial
court's final verdict to appeal successfully an erroneous disqualifi-
cation order, however, a second trial becomes necessary. The likeli-
hood of a second trial is not remote. If the trial courts had con-
victed the defendants in Agosto and Cunningham, and the
defendants then had appealed the disqualification orders, the ap-
pellate courts presumably would have ordered new trials. The time
and expense required for a delayed appeal followed by a second
trial undoubtedly exceed the time and expense required for an im-
mediate appeal alone. Therefore, denial of an immediate appeal
may pose a greater threat to the prosecutor's desire to prevent evi-
dence from becoming stale and to avoid losing potential witnesses;
allowing an immediate appeal of the disqualification order actually
would promote judicial economy.
The ethical standard of preserving the integrity of the legal pro-
fession should preclude the prosecutor from considering the harm
100. 657 F.2d at 1113.
101. Id.
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to his case that could result from a disqualification motion based
upon a conflict of interest, regardless of the timing of the appeal.
102
Nevertheless, the potential for delay resulting from the appeal of a
disqualification order strains the integrity of the legal profession
by discouraging the prosecutor from raising potential conflicts of
interest. Courts should consider the increased time and expense of
a second trial, the strain that the delayed appeal places on the in-
tegrity of the legal profession, and the additional burden on judi-
cial resources. Unless the desire to prevent trial delays exceeds the
cumulative effect of the court's desire to promote the integrity of
the legal profession, the defendant's right to choose counsel, and
the prosecutor's desire to avoid retrials, courts should encourage
immediate appeals of counsel disqualification orders.
Although the integrity of the legal profession and the time and
expense of unnecessary retrials are significant factors, the most
critical factor that courts must consider when assessing the need
for immediate appeals is the defendant's constitutionally guaran-
teed right to the counsel of his choice. The defendant's right to
counsel of his choice becomes particularly important when the de-
fendant retains counsel instead of relying on appointed counsel.10 3
For many defendants, the most important factor in choosing an
attorney is the relationship between the client and a particular
lawyer. The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the
assistance of an attorney,0 4 and much has been written on the
right to "effective counsel." 10 5 If the defendant asserts that a dis-
102. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1, supra note 1.
103. Greger, Agosto, and Cunningham involved retained counsel. Disqualifications of ap-
pointed counsel may present other problems. Unlike a defendant who retains an attorney, a
defendant who has court-appointed counsel probably will not have as strong an interest in
representation by a particular lawyer. But even if a defendant has court-appointed counsel,
the arguments concerning efficient judicial administration would apply. See supra text ac-
companying note 101.
104. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy ... the assistance of counsel
for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
105. See, e.g., Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1973);
Erikson, Standards of Competency for Defense Counsel in a Criminal Case, 17 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 233 (1979); Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077
(1973); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Convic-
tion Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289 (1964); Comment, The Effective Assis-
tance of Counsel: Chance or Guarantee?, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85 (1982); Note, Identifying
and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look after
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qualification order has undermined his right to effective counsel,
then immediate review of the order best serves the integrity of the
judicial system and the defendant's sixth amendment right. Avoid-
ing delay does not justify denial or postponement of the defen-
dant's constitutional rights.
APPLICABILITY OF Firestone TO COUNSEL DISQUALIFICArION IN
CRIMINAL CASES
The only Supreme Court case addressing the appealability of
counsel disqualification orders is Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord.0 8 Firestone involved the appealability of an order denying
a disqualification motion in a civil case. Although disqualification
orders in the civil context have some similarities to orders in the
criminal context, the Eighth Circuit in Agosto properly distin-
guished orders denying disqualification motions from orders grant-
ing such motions.'0 7
All orders that decide motions for counsel disqualification have
certain similarities. For example, the same delay results from an
immediate appeal of an order granting disqualification as from an
immediate appeal of an order denying disqualification. 0 8 The time
required to hear an appeal may vary from case to case, but the
length of delay does not depend on whether the trial court grants
or denies the disqualification motion, or whether the case is civil or
criminal. Also, the significance of counsel disqualifications to the
parties involved is similar whether the case is civil or criminal.
These superficial similarities suggest that the decision in Firestone
may apply equally to orders granting disqualification motions.
The applicability of Firestone, however, ultimately depends
upon the appellate court's construction of the Cohen collateral or-
der test. As the decision in Greger indicates, a narrow interpreta-
tion of the collateral order doctrine leads to a rejection of all im-
United States v. Decoster, 93 HARv. L. REv. 752 (1980); Note, Effective Assistance of Coun-
sel for the Indigent Defendant, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1435 (1965); Note, Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 49 VA. L. REv. 1531 (1963).
106. 449 U.S. 368 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 38-47.
107. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
108. After Firestone, of course, orders denying disqualification motions are not immedi-
ately appealable in civil cases. The Supreme Court has not considered such denials in the
criminal context.
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mediate appeals of disqualification decisions.10 9 Conversely, if an
appellate court recognizes the dissimilarities between orders grant-
ing disqualification motions and those denying them, then the Co-
hen test presents no obstacle to immediate review of an order
granting the motion.
The major distinction between appeals of orders granting dis-
qualification motions and those denying them is the position of the
parties filing the appeals. When a court denies a disqualification
motion, the party that originally made the motion obviously brings
the appeal; when a court grants a disqualification motion, the
party that opposed the motion brings the appeal. In the first situa-
tion, the original lawyers for both parties remain active in the liti-
gation. In the second situation, however, the court has disqualified
one of the original attorneys, possibly prejudicing the effective
presentation of his client's case. 110 When a court disqualifies the
attorney for one party, that party suffers greater harm than the
party who fails to have his opponent's counsel disqualified.1
Disqualification in civil and criminal cases presents a more basic
distinction between the situation in Greger and Agosto and the one
in Firestone. Although disqualification in civil cases may involve
large amounts of money, the loss of one's liberty is generally more
significant than the loss of one's property. The sixth amendment
right to counsel applies to "all criminal prosecutions," 2 indicating
the significance that the drafters of the Constitution attached to
the consequences of a criminal case. Anytime a judicial order af-
fects the right to counsel in a criminal case, the constitutional im-
plications are serious enough to warrant immediate attention."'
109. The court in Greger cited Firestone approvingly- "Emphasizing the narrowness of
the Cohen exception and the policies served by § 1291's insistence that appeals await final
judgment, the Court held that orders denying motions to disqualify counsel are not appeala-
ble orders." 657 F.2d at 1111.
110. If the litigant lacks confidence in the replacement attorney, he is not likely to be as
forthcoming and his reticence may prevent the second attorney from effectively representing
him. This danger is greatest in criminal cases, threatening the defendant's constitutional
right to effective counsel.
111. Failure to have an opposing attorney disqualified does not force either party to pro-
ceed without the lawyer of his choice.
112. See supra note 104.
113. Several landmark decisions of the Supreme Court have involved the right to counsel.
See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (no affirmative duty for the trial court to
inquire into the propriety of multiple representation); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475
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A party may have different tactical reasons for requesting coun-
sel disqualification in civil cases than in criminal cases. In civil
cases, either side may use a counsel disqualification motion as a
delaying tactic.114 The danger is that disqualification motions may
become simply one of a series of delaying motions, rather than a
device to police the integrity of the legal profession. Such tactics
also could frustrate the policy of judicial economy. Because of the
potential for abuse in civil cases, courts justifiably discourage the
use of disqualification motions.
The use of a counsel disqualification motion as a delaying tactic
is less likely in criminal cases. The prosecution generally seeks to
avoid delay in criminal cases, and the defense rarely makes a dis-
qualification motion. 115 The disqualification issue in a criminal
case, therefore, is almost certain to be substantial; otherwise, the
prosecution would not move for disqualification. Thus, the need
for an immediate resolution of the disqualification issue is greater
in criminal than in civil cases because the motion is -more likely to
involve genuine concerns than mere tactical considerations. These
factors bring a disqualification order in a criminal case within the
ambit of the collateral order doctrine.
(1978) (recognizing that a lawyer forced to represent codefendants whose interests conflict
cannot provide the adequate legal assistance required by the sixth amendment); Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (the right to proceed without counsel when voluntarily and
intelligently electing to do so); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (extending the
right to counsel to misdemeanor cases); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establish-
ing the right to counsel in all felony cases).
114. In Firestone, the Court was concerned that the likelihood of tactical delays would
increase if immediate appeals of orders denying counsel disqualifications in civil cases were
allowed. 449 U.S. at 374.
115. See supra note 6. In State v. Powell, 186 Conn. 547, 442 A.2d 939 (1982), the defen-
dants moved to disqualify the prosecuting attorney, alleging that he had a "personal interest
in the outcome of the trial." Id. at _ 442 A.2d at 944. Based on Firestone, the court
dismissed the appeals, concluding that "the order denying the defendants' motions to dis-
qualify is not a final judgment and may not be immediately appealed." Id. If the trial court
had granted the defendants' motion, the appellate court may have decided the appealability
issue differently.
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APPLICABILITY OF THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE TO COUNSEL
DISQUALIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES
Supreme Court Application of the Collateral Order Doctrine in
Criminal Cases
The Supreme Court has considered the collateral order doctrine
in the context of criminal cases on several occasions. In each case,
policy considerations have determined the appealability of the
lower court's order. On three occasions the Court has found that
an order satisfied the collateral order. requirements. In Stack v.
Boyle,"' the Court held that an order denying a motion to reduce
bail was appealable as a "final decision" under section 1291. Simi-
larly, in Abney v. United States,"7 the Court held that an order
denying a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeop-
ardy grounds was immediately appealable. The Court noted that
"if a criminal defendant is to avoid exposure to double jeopardy
and thereby enjoy the full protection of that Clause, his double
jeopardy challenge to the indictment must be reviewable before
that subsequent exposure occurs."""' Finally, in Helstoski v. Mea-
nor,"9 the Court held that a United States Congressman could
take an interlocutory appeal to assert the immunity conferred
upon him by the speech or debate clause of the Constitution.'2 0
The Court found a common element in each of these cases that
allowed the Court to apply the collateral order doctrine. Each of
the defendants had "an asserted right the legal and practical value
of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before
trial.' 21 The decisions suggest that an appellate court should de-
cide whether a trial court's order comes within the collateral order
exception by weighing the value of the right impaired by the order
against the threat of undue delay.
In contrast, the Supreme Court held in two criminal cases that
certain orders did not meet the requirements of the collateral or-
116. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
117. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
118. Id. at 662.
119. 442 U.S. 500, 506 (1979).
120. Helstoski had attempted to challenge the validity of his indictment by using a writ
of mandamus, but the Court held that a direct appeal was available. Id. at 508.
121. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978).
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der doctrine. In United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co.,122 the
Court found that an order denying a motion to dismiss based on
prosecutorial vindictiveness was not appealable before completion
of the trial. Similarly, in United States v. MacDonald,23 the Court
held that an order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the
indictment because of an alleged violation of his sixth amendment
right to a speedy trial was not immediately appealble. In both
cases the Court reasoned that "the right asserted by respondents is
simply not one that must be upheld prior to trial if it is to be en-
joyed at all.' 11 24 The Court may have feared that virtually all defen-
dants could raise claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness or failure to
attain a speedy trial in criminal cases. Counsel disqualification mo-
tions, in contrast, do not arise in most criminal cases. Therefore,
the potential for delay caused by immediate appeals of orders dis-
qualifying counsel is less significant than the possibility of delay
caused by other appeals.
Disqualification Orders and the Collateral Order Exception
Requirements
The first element of the collateral order test requires that the
order conclusively determine the disputed question. 25 Orders dis-
qualifying counsel in criminal cases easily meet this requirement.
In Firestone, the Court recognized that an order denying a dis-
qualification motion in a civil case met this aspect of the collateral
order test. The Court held that the disqualification order "'conclu-
sively determine[s] the disputed question,' because the only issue
is whether challenged counsel will be permitted to continue his
representation.' ' 26 After the trial court has disqualified a litigant's
122. 102 S. Ct. 3081 (1982) (per curiam). Justice Blackmun wrote a vigorous dissent to
the per curiam opinion and chastized the Court for its summary decision on such a "sub-
stantial and controversial question." Id. at 3086 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority
failed to convince Justice Blackmun that a motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial vindic-
tiveness was not immediately appealable because "post-conviction review may not suffice to
remedy the chilling effect the vindictive prosecution doctrine is designed to prevent." Id. at
3087.
123. 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
124. 102 S. Ct. at 3085.
125. See supra text accompanying note 36.
126. 449 U.S. 368, 375-76 (1981). In his concurrence in Firestone, Justice Rehnquist sug-
gested that an order denying disqualifiation does not meet the first part of the collateral
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counsel, he must proceed with alternate counsel if the appellate
court does not allow an immediate appeal. Acquiring new counsel
and proceeding with the trial makes the order essentially irreversi-
ble.11 7 The disqualification imposes a material change in the posi-
tion of the litigant whose counsel is disqualified by forcing the liti-
gant to acquire replacement counsel.
The second element of the Cohen test requires that the appeal
resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of
the action. 128 Disqualification orders easily meet this requirement
as well. The qualifications of a litigant's lawyer do not constitute
the basis for the criminal action against the litigant, but are collat-
eral to the primary litigation. The Supreme Court in Firestone as-
sumed without discussion that disqualification orders met this part
of the collateral order doctrine. 12 9
The third requirement of the collateral order test, that the order
appealed from be "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment,"'130 presents the most vexatious problem. The key
phrase-"effectively unreviewable"-is open to a variety of inter-
pretations. A defendant carl appeal a disqualification order after
final judgment, but the damage to the defendant's rights occurs at
the time of disqualification. A motion to disqualify a criminal de-
fendant's attorney disrupts the defense and forces the defendant
to retain a second attorney or accept court-appointed counsel.
Thus, an erroneous disqualification order and the resulting harm
to a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel are ef-
fectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
If the appeal of the disqualification order must await the trial
court's final judgment, a question arises concerning the two ap-
proaches that the appeals court might take when determining the
order test. He observed that the denial does not determine conclusively the issue because
the trial court can reconsider its decision at any time. If the moving party produces further
evidence at some point in the trial, the judge can reverse his decision and grant disqualifica-
tion. Id. at 380-82. If a trial judge grants a disqualification motion, however, he cannot recall
the disqualified attorney and resume the trial from the point at which he disqualified the
attorney.
127. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litigation,
658 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982).
128. See supra text accompanying note 36.
129. 449 U.S. at 376.
130. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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effect of the disqualification order. An appellate court could treat
post-judgment appeals and immediate appeals alike by examining
whether the trial court granted the disqualification motion for le-
gitimate reasons. Alternatively, the appellate court could deter-
mine whether the defendant received competent representation
from his new counsel after the disqualification order."' 1 A court fol-
lowing the second approach would examine events that transpired
at the trial after the first counsel was disqualified-facts not rele-
vant to the propriety of the disqualification order itself. Because a
reversal of the trial court's disqualification order results in a con-
victed defendant's retrial, an appellate court may focus only on
whether the replacement counsel adequately represented the de-
fendant and thus fulfilled the defendant's sixth amendment right
to counsel. Questions about adequate representation by a second
attorney, however, are peripheral to the disqualification of the de-
fendant's chosen counsel. The confusion surrounding the correct
approach for reviewing counsel disqualification orders, and the po-
tentially irreparable damage done to the defendant, make counsel
disqualification orders effectively unreviewable on appeal from
final judgments. To avoid confusion of the issues and protect the
defendant's right to counsel, courts should allow immediate
appeals.
Direct Appeals and the Protection of Fundamental Rights
When determining whether counsel disqualification orders sat-
isfy the collateral order doctrine, the ultimate question is whether
disallowing an immediate appeal infringes a fundamental right. A
counsel disqualification order does not fall into the collateral order
exception to section 1291 as easily as an appeal of an order denying
a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy
grounds.132 On the other hand, counsel disqualification orders are
not as clearly outside the collateral order doctrine as an order de-
nying a motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial vindictiveness.1 33
131. The standard for determining what constitutes "effective" counsel has created
problems of its own. See supra note 105. See also United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
132. See, e.g., Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 102 S. Ct. 3081 (1982). Money
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Due to the sixth amendment concerns involved, counsel disquali-
fication orders are similar to the situation in United States v.
MacDonald.3 4 In MacDonald, the Supreme Court held that an or-
der denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment be-
cause of an alleged violation of his sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial was not appealable. The distinction that justifies a dif-
ferent result in a disqualification case is the availability of the
speedy trial motion to any defendant. Based on a violation of his
right to a speedy trial, any criminal defendant could file a motion
to dismiss followed by a direct appeal if the trial court denied the
motion. A defendant whose counsel has been disqualified, however,
deserves an appeal based on the threat to his sixth amendment
right. Unlike a speedy trial motion, the decision to file a disqualifi-
cation motion in a criminal case rests with the prosecution, not
with the defendant.135
Another distinction involves the basis upon which the Supreme
Court reached its decision in MacDonald. In MacDonald, the
Court denied an immediate appeal because "[p]roceeding with the
trial does not cause or compound the deprivation already suf-
fered."13 Allowing immediate appeals of pretrial and trial motions
does nothing to ensure the defendant's right to a speedy trial; in
fact, it compounds the violation of that right. A refusal to hear an
immediate appeal of a counsel disqualification order, however, does
"compound the deprivation already suffered." A trial court that er-
roneously disqualifies a defendant's attorney may harm the defen-
dant irreparably if the appellate court refuses to hear an immedi-
ate appeal. If the defendant must wait until after final judgment to
appeal, the appellate court faces the impossible task of returning
the defendant to the position that he occupied before the order
was granted. Review after final judgment, therefore, is ineffective.
Many factors in addition to the disqualification order may be-
come important in the case before the trial court renders a final
judgment. These other factors, primarily involving the merits of
the criminal case, also affect the defendant materially. After final
damages could compensate a defendant adequately for prosecutorial vindictiveness.
134. 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
135. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
136. 435 U.S. at 861.
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judgment, an appellate court would have difficulty isolating the
factors resulting from the disqualification order. In bringing a
post-judgment appeal of a counsel disqualification order, the de-
fendant is in a substantially different position than if the trial
court had allowed his original counsel to continue. Thus, the col-
lateral order exception should allow immediate appeals of disquali-
fication orders in criminal cases under section 1291.
CONCLUSION
When a trial court disqualifies a criminal defendant's attorney,
the defendant suffers an immediate and direct harm. The defen-
dant seeking to appeal the disqualification order has a strong inter-
est in being represented by his original lawyer. Choice of counsel
involves an element of trust and confidence that the court should
protect because the defendant's relationship with his attorney is a
key factor underlying full and effective representation. Disqualifi-
cation of counsel in a criminal case affects the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel. The importance of preserving that
right suggests that an immediate resolution of the issue would pro-
vide the best protection for the affected party. Therefore, appellate
courts should allow immediate appeals under the collateral order
exception to the final-judgment rule because the disqualification
order conclusively resolves the disputed question of a counsel's
qualifications, the issue is collateral to the merits of the particular
case, and the disqualification is effectively unreviewable on appeal
following the conclusion of the criminal trial.
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